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German Enlightenment 
The German Enlightenment aimed to spread the ideas of Rationalism among a large 
educated public. The most imponant representatives of the movement (in the specific 
sense) in Germany were lI'Leibniz, $Lamben, -'Lessing, and .... Wolff. 
Concurrently, Herder and Hamann were developing their ideas on education and 
progress, which sought to overcome the divisions between sense (Sinnlirhkeit) and 
understanding (Verstand) as well as between nature and ·history. They regarded natural 
human $Ianguage ·competen~ as an instance where this division is overcome, since it 
manifests itSelf simultaneously as a divine and a natural principle, both making human 
reason visible and at the same time being a product of nature. The semiotics of 4-German 
Romanticism was based on this uadition. The critical uanscendentalism of ""Kant gave a 
new turn to the Enlightenment: namely towards a reflection on the conditions which 
make subjective knowledge and ·action possible; it thereby became critical in a new 
sense, in that it pointed to the limitations of human knowledge. 
In the history of ·philosophy, the German Enlightenment undoubtedly formulated 
the most optimistic position with regard to the epistemological achievements of semio-
tics. Ils conception of semiotics draws on twO approaches: (1) ""Descartes' Mathesis Uni-
'Versa/is, a methodological ideal including, by taking "mathematics as its model, the four 
rules of the Discours sur fa Methode and the supposition that the simplest basic terms can 
be completely enumerated; and (2) Raimund lI'Lull's Ars magna, a doctrine on the gener· 
auon of all notions proceeding from nine simple basic ·terms through the combination 
of its ·signs (Arndt 1971a; Engfer 1976; Hubig 197ge), Signs are therefore a necessary 
element of knowledge. Their constitutive .... function is based on their quality of being in 
isomorphic relation to things; for that reason knowledge is guaranteed merely by the 
recognition of the "rules by which they are connected, using the algebra or the 
geometrical axiomatic as model. The ars characteristica universalis, conceived in such a 
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way, can be realized either as ars iudicandi or as an inveniendi. The fonner is to elimi-
nate the sources of mistakes and the anomalies of natural languages, the latter shows the 
way to acquire new knowledge (ars combinatoria). 
Such an anificial sign language is regarded as being in a different relation to natural 
languages. It is either conceived as a complete system of representation, inaccessible to 
human understanding which, for this reason, is only able to outline characteristics of 
limited areas (Leibniz). Or, it may be considered:as an ideal into which natural language 
must be transfonned through the elimination of iu mistakes and misunderstandings 
(Wolff), a position that presupposes a comprehensive lexicography of all concepts rele-
vant to ""epistemology. Under the postulate of Mathesis, it also may be considered as an 
"organon" - tool- the validity of which is limited by the use of natural language (Lam-
bert). As pan philosophical >Ioaesthetics, it may constitute a philosophical approach to 
potticelfects (Lessing). 
All these positions have in common a double use of the concept of sign. First. signs. 
through the isomorphy (or similarity) or their "'structure, refer to things and represent 
them. Second. they achieve this by means of the notions of the ideas of the things which 
constitute the connection. Signs are either natural (which are clear per se - i.e., through 
sensation) or conventional. Furthermore, signs serve as insuuments of imagination 
which, otherwise, would be only unclear in memory. Judgments about objectS thus can 
be only justified through the handling of signs. In the history of this double function of 
signs, the latter aspect successively grew more imponant until the Kantian revolu-
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